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IN THE SUPREME COURT

of the
STATE OF UTAH

\ \' alker Bank & Trust Company,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent~

vs.
Spencer C. Taylor, Bank Commissioner
of the State of Utah, and State Bank
of Provo, a Utah corporation,
Defendants-Appellants.

APPELLA~S'

No.
9947

REPLY BRIEF

THE C.A.SE OF THE FOUR ANOMALIES
In our opening brief, appellants have pointed out:
1. The anomaly of the second largest bank in the

State of l__Ttah, with thirteen branches and resources in
excess of $240,000,000, a member of a multi-state banking chain having nearly $6,000,000,000 in deposits and
some 44 i banking offices located throughout the eleven
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Western states, claiming to be irreparably injured by
the only branch of a small independent bank in Provo,
Utah, having only $7,000,000 in deposits. ·
2. The anomaly of a large metropolitan bank with

numerous branches using as a sword against a small
independent bank a statute designed as a shield to protect small independent banks from the monopolistic
tendencies of a large chain banking system.I
3. The anomaly of the plaintiff's argument that

it is not the fact that it has a branch in Provo, but that
the defendant State Bank of Provo itself is there, that
precludes defendant from establishing a branch in
Provo, Utah.
Respondent's brief presents a fourth. Walker Bank
argues in its Point 1 that the statute in question is clear
and unambiguous and therefore the court should not
look to the intent of the legislature or resort to any of
the other principles of statutory interpretation. But
in its Point 2, 'Valker Bank's argument is that when
the legislature referred to "a bank or banks," it must
have meant ubank or banks or, a branch thereof.-'-' If the
court must, on Point 2, apply the rules of statutory
construction to interpret section 7-3-6, Walker Bank's
argument on Point 1 for a disregard of those rules in
reading that same sentence falls of its own weight.
tWalker Bank and First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., the two
banks having branches in Provo had, in 1962, 44.4 per cent of
all banking offices in the State and held between them 51 per
cent of all the bank deposits in the State. Report on Bank Holding
Companies, Committee on Banking and Currency, House of Representatives, 88th Cong., 1963.
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It has been appellants' position throughout that
whether the question of statutory interpretation be considered in the light of the fact that Walker Bank has
a brandt in Provo or the fact that the State Bank of
ProYo is the only bank in Provo, the language of the
whole statute and the history surrounding its enactment
must be considered to determine the legislative intent.
Appellants' position is in accord with the basic
principle of statutory interpretation recognized by this
court:
" ... 'in the exposition of a statute , the intention of the lawmaker will prevail over the literal
sense of the terms ... ' " Norville v. State Tax
Commission, 98 Utah 120, 97 P.2d 937, 939
(1940).
'Vhether this principle is reached by thought process
alone or with the aid of more divine counsel, appellants
are pleased to note that this court's approach finds support in scripture. As St. Paul said in his second letter
to the Church in Corinth,
"Follow not of the letter, but of the spirit, for
the letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life." 2
Corinthians 3 :6.

I. 'V ALKER BANK'S RELIANCE ON ONE
SENTENCE OF SECTION 7-3-6 IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE STATUTE OR THE PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION.

,yalker Bank states its position bluntly. It claims:
5
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" ... Section 7-3-6 prohibits the operation of
branches in any city not of the first class where
a bank is already located, except only where a
branch results from a bank taking over an existing bank." Resp. Br. P. 3.
This result may not be absurd to the Walker Bank,
for every branch it has established outside Salt Lake
County has been secured by taking over an existing
bank such as in Provo, in Logan, and in Price.
But the result is absurd when applied to the only
bank in the community-it is absurd to tell the people
of Provo the only way the only bank chartered to serve
that community may provide additional banking services
is for the State Bank of Provo to take over itself!
Walker Bank makes no attempt to explain why
the legislature would have intended such an absurd
result. It first cites Union Trust Company v. Sirn1nons,
116 Utah 422, 211 P.2d 190 (1949). But that case
did not deal with the problem of the only bank in that
community seeking to establish a branch of itself. In
that case, the Union Trust Company, a Salt Lake City
bank, was seeking to establish a branch in Ogden where
there were located other banks. This involved the very
situation in which the legislature intended to protect
local banks from outside invasion by branches. That case
supports defendants', not plaintiff's interpretation of
the statute.
Walker Bank then argues the statute is "clearly
unambiguous" and thus there is "no occasion to resort

6
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

to rules in aid of statutory construction or search for
the statute's meaning beyond the statute itself." Respondtw:nt's Brief, page 7.
That conclusion is not the law.
"The duty devolves on the court to ascertain
the true meaning where the language of a statute
is of doubtful meaning, or where an adherence
to the strict letter would lead to injustice, to
absurdity, or to contradictory provisions." 82
C.J.S., Statutes, §322.
A clear exposition of the proper approach to statutory
construction is the statement for the Supreme Court
hy l\Ir. Justice Reed in United States v. America·n
Trucking Association~ 310 U.S. 534 (1940):
"In the interpretation of statutes, the function
of the courts is easily stated. It is to construe
the language so as to give effect to the intent of
Congress. There is no invariable rule for the discoverv of that intention. To take a few words
from their context and with them thus isolated to
attempt to determine their meaning, certainly
would not contribute greatly to the discovery of
the purpose of the draftsmen of a statute, particularly in a law drawn to meet many needs of
a major occupation.
"There is, of course, no more persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute than the words
by which the legislature undertook to give expression to its wishes. Often these words are sufficient in and of themselves to determine the
purpose of the legislation. In such cases we have
followed their plain meaning. When that meaning has led to absurd or futile results, however,
7
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this Court has looked beyond the words to the
purpose of the act. Frequently, however, even
when the plain meaning did not produce absurd
results but merely an unreasonable one 'plainly
at variance with the policy of the legislation as
a whole' this Court has followed that purpose,
rather than the literal words. When aid to construction of the meaning of words, as used in the
statute, is available, there certainly can be no
'rule of law' which forbids its use, however clear
the words may apear on 'superficial examination.' The interpretation of the meaning of
statutes, as applied to justiciable controversies,
is exclusively a judicial function. This duty
requires one body of public servants, the judges,
to construe the meaning of what another body,
the legislators, has said. Obviously there is dan-'
ger that the courts' conclusion as to legislative
purpose will be unconsciously influenced by the
judges' own views or by factors not considered
by the enacting body. A lively appreciation of
the danger is the best assurance of escape from
its threat but hardly justifies an acceptance of a
literal interpretation dogma which· withholds
from the courts available information for reaching a correct conclusion. Emphasis should be
laid, too, upon the necessity for appraisal of the
purposes as a whole of Congress in analyzing
the meaning of clauses or sections of general acts.
A few words of general connotation appearing
in the text of statutes should not be given a wide
meaning ,contrary to a settled policy, 'excepting
as a different p·urpose is plainly shown." Pages
542-544.

Thus in its argument, Walker Bank makes several
errors of omission.
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1. It has failed to deny or meet appellants' show-

ing that the result Walker Bank claims from a literal
reading of one sentence of the statute is completely
absurd-that the only bank in the community cannot
establish a branch of itself. United States v. A.merican
Trucking Associations~ sup1"a~ Girardi v. Lipsetts~ Inc.~
275 F.2d 492 (3rd Cir., 1960), United States v. Gertz~
~-H) F .~d 662 (9th Cir., 1957). Walker Bank's literal
reading of one sentence o£ the statute would reach the
absurd result that in any city not of the first classany city other than Salt Lake City-where there is only
one bank, the legislature intended that same bank's
existence would preclude it from establishing a branch
of itself in that same community even though the Bank
Commissioner and the Governor found that the public
convenience and advantage would be subserved and
promoted thereby.
2. It brushes off as a "nebulous theory" the history

of branch banking legislation and the very framework
of the Utah statute itself which makes it clear that
the legislature was intending to protect unit banks in
cities outside Salt Lake City from invasion by larger
city banks and argues for a literal reading which would
frustrate that legislative purpose. United States v.
American Trucking Association~ supra.
3. It bases its claim of "clear and unambiguous"
language on the reading of only one sentence of the
section dealing with branches. Federal Trade Commission t'. TuttleJ 244 F.2d 605 (2d Cir., 1957):

9
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"As the Supreme Court has repeated several
times: 'In expounding a statute, we must not be
guided by a single sentence or member of a
sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole
law and to its object and policy.' " Page 614.
4. It offers no explanation for the entire fourth

paragraph of section 7-3-6 making special provisions
with respect to branches in communities outside Salt
Lake County. As this court noted in Allen v. Board of
Education, 120 Utah 556, 236 P.2d 756 (1951):
"This being so the court should have looked
at the conditions and circumstances which motivated the framers of the Constitution and subsequent Legislatures in placing boards of education in cities in a separate administrative category from school districts and counties outside
of cities, and, if ascertainable, to define the objectives to be obtained thereby."
5. It offers no answer to the constitutional question
posed by the restriction on branches outside Salt Lake
County contained in paragraph 4 of 7-3-6 (See Appellants' Brief, pages 38-39).
We submit that the whole of paragraph 4 of section 7-3-6 must be read together. Its second sentence
was clearly designed to supplement the first by preventing the circumvention of the legislative intent by merely
establishing a new unit bank one day and branching it
by acquisition the next.
The entire paragraph in question reads as follows:
"Except in cities of the first class, or within
unincQrporated areas of a county in which a city

10
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of the first class is located, no branch bank shall
be established in any city or town in which is
located a bank or banks, state or national, regularly transacting a customary banking business,
unless the bank seeking to establish such branch
shall take over an existing bank. No unit bank
organized and operating at a point where there
are other operating banks~ state or national, shall
be permitted to be acquired by another bank for
the purpose of establishing a branch until such
bank shall have been in operation as such for a
period of five years." (Emphasis supplied).
If the unit bank organized and operating at the
point where there are other operating banks may not
be acquired by another bank for the purpose of making
it a branch until the unit bank has been in operation
for at least five years, then it must also be true that a
unit bank, organized and operating at a point where
there are no other unit banks operating, may be acquired
by another bank for the purpose of making it a branch
without waiting until it has been in operation for five
years. The presence or absence of other banks at the
point where the proposed take over is to occur. is the
critical factor in determining whether or not the bank
to be acquired must have been in operation for at least
five years.
If the presence or absence of other banks is the
determining factor in the takeover restriction of the
paragraph in question, is that not also the determining
factor in the first restriction embraced within the same
paragraph? That is, the restriction on where branches
may be established with relation to unit banks, par-

11
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ticularly, where the second restriction was clearly designed to prevent circumvention of the first. So when
the legislature said "No branch bank shall be established
in any city or town in which is located a bank or banks,"
it meant as it said expressly in the second restriction,
in which is located another bank or banks. The legislature must have intended both restrictions to apply only
where there was a competing bank. It did not intend
either restriction to apply where there was no other
competing bank.
It inescapeably follows that the purpose of the
whole paragraph is to prevent the establishment of
de novo branches in communities outside of Salt Lake
County where there is another unit bank in operation.
In Provo, there is no unit bank other than the State
Bank of Provo. Therefore, the purpose of the statutory
restriction is met by allowing that bank to establish a
branch of itself.
II. WALKER BANK'S ARGUMENT FAILS
TO RECOGNIZE THE STATUTORY DISTINCTION B E T "\tV E E N BANKS AND
BRANCHES.
In its argument under Point 2 of its brief, Walker
·Bank, rather than meeting defendants' contentions, misstates them and then attempts to dispose of the straw
man it has thus created. We do not contend that plaintiff is not doing a banking business at its branch in
Provo, and we do not contend that its Provo office is
a different legal entity. What we do contend is that
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plaintiff's office in Provo is a branch as defined in the
applicable statute and that the legislature, in that
statute, has distinguished between banks and branches
with respect to the location of branches.
First of all it should be noted that the applicable
sentence of the statute refers only to "bank or banks."
Elsewhere in the same section the legislature has clearly
distinguished between banks and branches in dealing
with the location of the latter. Plaintiff's argument
here is that when dealing with its own branch~ the court
should not apply the literal language of the statute as
plaintiff advocates when dealing with defendaf\t's banlc.
'fo apply plaintiff's own technique, its contention is
that the statute should read:
"Except in cities of the first class, or within
the unincorporated areas of a county in which a
citv of the first class is located, no branch bank
sh~ll be established in any city .or town in whicl~
is located a bank or banks, state or national,
[or a branch thereof] regularly transacting a
customary banking business, unless the bank
seeking to establish such branch shall take over
an existing bank."
Secondly, plaintiff seeks to obfuscate the issue by
blurring the question of a corporate entity with that of
the statutory requirements as to location of branch
offices. Plaintiff argues that the distinction betweenbanks ·and branches "has no significance in resolving
the question of where a banking institution is located
and transacting business." Plaintiff cites as "grotesque"
the situation as to First Security Bank of Utah, N.A.,

13
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whose home office is in Ogden, with numerous branches
in Salt Lake City and elsewhere in the State of Utah.
But that bank, despite its numerous branches, including
the one in Provo, is located in Ogden. For example,
under 12 U.S.C. 94, a national bank may be sued only
in the district court, state or federal, in which it is
"located," and a national bank is located "only in the
place where its principal office and place of business.
is as specified in its organization certificate." Leonardi
v. Chase National Bank~ 81 F.2d 19 (2d Cir., 1936);
Buffum v. ChaseNational Bank~ 192 F.2d 58 (7th Cir.,
1951); Mercantile National Bank v. Langdeau, 371
U.S. 555, 9 L.ed 2d 523 (1963).
We submit the distinction made by the legislature
between banks and branches in section 7-3-6 deals not
with whether they are separate legal entities, but where
and under what conditions branches may be locatedthe very issue presented in the case at bar.
The legislature first enacted what is now section
7-3-6 in 1911 when it sought to prohibit branch banking
entirely. Therefore, the statute began:
"The business of every bank shall be conducted
only at its banking house ... "
Walker Bank claims we ask this court to judicially
amend this sentence by inserting the word "main"
before the words "banking house." We submit that the
legislature could only have meant the main banking
house when it enacted these words in 1911 as it was at
that time expressly prohibiting all other banking offices.
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In 1naa ,the legislature amended the statute by
adding an exception for branches, so the statute was
made to read as it now does :
"The business of every bank shall be conducted
only at its banking house ... except as hereinafter provided."
That "hereinafter provided" is the next paragraph of
section 7-3-6 which authorizes the establishment of
branches. Then follows a sentence making a clear distinction between the main banking house and a branch.
That sentence deals with the location of banking offices
and begins:
"All banking houses and branches shall he
located ... "
Thereafter, and throughout the entire section of 7-3-6,
the legislature has used the word '_'bank" when dealing
with a unit bank or the head office of a chain and the
word "branch" when dealing with the additional offices
first authorized in 1933. In using these words in this
statute, the legislature was not dealing with the concept
of an octopus-like legal entity with numerous tentacles
extending throughout the state, but with the problem
of where and under what conditions additional offices
-branches-for the conduct of the business of a bank
(a legal entity) might be located.
"\Ye ask no judicial amendment of this statute. We
ask only that the entire statute be read and applied to
give effect to the legislative intent. On that basis, the
decision of the Bank Commissioner and the Governor
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in approving the application of the State Bank of Provo
to establish a branch on the Brigham Young University
campus was authorized by law.
Respectfully submitted,
Peter \V. Billings
John F. Lee
Fabian & Clendenin
800 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Appellant
State Bank of Provo
A. Pratt Kesler
Attorney General
H. Wright Volker
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Appellant
Spencer C. Taylor
Bank Commissioner
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